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Social media platforms have been rapidly increasing the number of informational labels 
they are appending to user-generated content in order to indicate the disputed nature of 
messages or to provide context. The rise of this practice constitutes an important new 
chapter in social media governance, as companies are often choosing this new “middle 
way” between a laissez-faire approach and more drastic remedies such as removing or 
downranking content. Yet information labeling as a practice has, thus far, been mostly 
tactical, reactive, and without strategic underpinnings. In this paper, we argue against 
defining success as merely the curbing of misinformation spread. The key to thinking about 
labeling strategically is to consider it from an epistemic perspective and to take as a starting 
point the “social” dimension of online social networks. The strategy we articulate 
emphasizes how the moderation system needs to improve the epistemic position and 
relationships of platform users — i.e., their ability to make good judgements about the 
sources and quality of the information with which they interact on the platform — while 
also appropriately respecting sources, seekers, and subjects of information. A systematic 
and normatively grounded approach can improve content moderation efforts by providing 
clearer accounts of what the goals are, how success should be defined and measured, and 
where ethical considerations should be taken into consideration. We consider implications 
for the policies of social media companies, propose new potential metrics for success, and 
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Labeling is a content moderation tool that social media companies have at their 
disposal to indicate to users something about the quality of information that 
appears on their platforms. Information quality labeling can be either negative or 
positive. Negative labeling indicates to users that the information they are viewing 
is of poor or questionable quality—e.g., unverified, false, contested, from an 
untrusted source. Positive labeling indicates to users that the information they are 
viewing meets a standard of quality—e.g., verified, fact checked, from a trusted 
source. Social media companies often deploy negative labeling tactically. That is, 
moderators use the tool in order to address a particular type of problem as it arises.  
 
For example, prior to the 2020 presidential election, Donald Trump indicated that 
he was likely to declare victory prematurely. Late on election night he did just that 
and falsely claimed that the election was being “stolen,” when in fact legitimate 
votes were still being counted. Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube labeled Trump’s 
false claims, which after the election continued on topics such as alleged voter 
fraud in various U.S. states. This moderation pattern continued until the platforms 
ultimately froze or removed his accounts in the wake of the U.S. Capitol attacks 
that his social media activities—false claims about the election, promulgation of 
conspiracy theories, approval of white nationalist extremists, and exhortations to 
fight the outcome—helped to foment.2 The platforms also have used information 
quality labeling as part of the effort to prevent the spread of COVID-19 
misinformation, QAnon conspiracy theories, and mail-in voting misinformation, 
for example.3 The use of labeling in these contexts is tactical in the sense that it is 
deployed “on the field” in the fight against misinformation or hate speech (among 
other things) in order to counteract a particular case of misinformation as it arises. 
Company policies—such as Facebook’s “Community Standards” or “The Twitter 
 
2 The social media companies responded with various types of labels. For example, 
Twitter used explanatory labeling text such as, “Learn more about US 2020 Election 
security efforts” with links to informational pages on Twitter, as well as content warning 
labels such as, “This Tweet is disputed and might be misleading about an election or 
other civic process” with a link to Twitter’s Civic integrity policy. Facebook used content 
warning interstitials for “false information” for posts claiming election fraud or attempts 
to intimidate voters; with a “false information” warning on an image, link, or post, users 
could click through to see the verified fact check sources on election information.  
3 Companies deploy labels for various purposes. For example, Google increased content 
transparency on YouTube by implementing publisher context labels on videos, which 
indicate whether a channel is “state sponsored” or is a “public broadcast service” to 
legitimize reliable information on political news. TikTok was prompted by COVID-19 
misinformation to implement widespread labeling on the platform, with Coronavirus 
information banners on related videos that linked to authoritative health sources. In 
order to increase friction between misinformation subreddits and Reddit users, the 
platform implements a “quarantine” on pages—accompanied by a warning label 
requiring users to explicitly opt-in to view the content in question—that promote 
conspiracies, hoaxes, and offensive content that violate Community Guidelines, as 
opposed to labeling individual pieces of content. Quarantined Subreddits, REDDIT,  
https://www.reddithelp.com/hc/en-us/articles/360043069012 (last visited Mar. 27, 




Rules”—also embody this tactical conception of information quality labeling.4 The 
policies are formulated as guidelines regarding the conditions under which the 
tactic will be employed. Depending on the perceived degree of potential severity 
or harm, as well as other factors such as the information source (e.g., Twitter has a 
distinct policy for world leaders), user-generated content may be subject to 
removal (primarily where physical harm may be involved), algorithmic reduction 
(making content less visible to other users), or labeling/information treatments, 
which may surface direct factchecks, more authoritative source information, or 
further information about the originating source of the content.  
 
However, it is also possible to think of information quality labeling strategically. 
That is, it is possible to consider information quality labeling as part of an 
approach to building a healthy informational environment. On this way of 
considering information labeling, it is not only deployed to combat a particular 
case of misinformation as it arises, but also to advance the informational quality 
of the platform overall and the user’s ability to effectively navigate the information 
ecosystem. It is this strategic conception of information labeling that is the focus 
of this paper. Our aim is to articulate more clearly how and in what sense 
informational labeling can be used in this way, as well as to identify key ethics and 
values questions that the platforms ought to consider if they were to do so. The 
result is an approach for thinking through how to develop a proactive and 
generally beneficial informational quality labeling system. 
 
The keys to thinking about labeling strategically is to consider it from an epistemic 
perspective and to take as a starting point the “social” dimension of online social 
networks. These together favor taking a social epistemological5 approach when 
thinking strategically about informational quality content labeling, as well as 
content moderation more generally. That is, platforms should carefully consider 
how the moderation system improves the epistemic position and relationships of 
platform users—i.e., their ability to make good judgements about the sources and 
quality of the information with which they interact on and beyond the platform—
while also appropriately respecting sources, seekers, and subjects of information.6  
 
In Section One, we provide a review of existing information quality labeling 
approaches and policies, as well as of the societal and industry context that frames 
these issues. An emphasis is placed on how they currently work and the associated 
 
4 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2020); The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
5 “Social epistemology,” as we mean the term, is a multidisciplinary field of inquiry that 
examines the social aspects of thought, rationality, justification, and knowledge and their 
normative implications. For some core examples of work that aligns well with our 
general approach to the field see ALVIN I GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); HELEN E. LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: 
VALUES AND OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Princeton University Press, 1990); 
MIRIAM SOLOMON, SOCIAL EMPIRICISM (A Bradford Book, 2007); ALVIN GOLDMAN & 
DENNIS WHITCOMB, SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY: ESSENTIAL READINGS (Oxford University Press 
US, 2011); Alvin Goldman and Cailin O’Connor, Social Epistemology, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/epistemology-social/.   
6 Kay Mathiesen, Informational Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Social Justice in Library 




problems, issues, and challenges. In Section Two, we discuss why a systematic 
content labeling approach begins with articulating the values and goals of the 
moderation regime. In Section Three, we explicate what we mean by taking a social 
epistemology approach to informational quality content labeling (and to content 
moderation more generally). We offer new potential measures for defining 
efficacy and success by content moderation efforts; these proposed measures stand 
as alternatives to merely limiting and measuring aggregate misinformation spread 
on platforms. In Section Four, we discuss how normative or ethical considerations 
can be incorporated into the approach. In Section Five, we conclude by identifying 
several ways in which the approach could help to inform and improve information 
quality labeling, as well as to guide further research into such improvements.7   
 
1. Section One: Defining the problem 
A. Complex mechanics 
Content moderation can be defined as the “governance mechanisms that structure 
participation in a community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse.”8 Social 
media companies typically outline their rules in their terms of service and 
community guidelines, although other policies may apply to content-related 
decisions. Users are often given some controls such as muting, unfollowing or 
blocking, as well as organizational options (e.g., by chronology or relevance), 
which allow for limited local forms of individual moderation.  
 
In general, companies that perform centralized moderation rely on a combination 
of user reports, or crowdsourced flagging, and automated systems to review 
content for possible action. Platforms with more decentralized or federated 
content moderation structures and mechanisms, such as Reddit, allow users to 
perform localized moderation functions within defined communities on the 
platform.9 For the purposes of this discussion, the social media platforms using a 
centralized approach, represented by YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, 
among others, will be the focus. 
 
 
7 While our focus here is largely on information quality labeling, the social epistemology 
approach that we advocate can be applied to other forms—for example, algorithmic 
interventions and downranking or upranking of content or sources—and targets of 
content moderation, mutatis mutandis. 
8 James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 Yale J.L. & Tech. 42 (2015). 
9 For a discussion of the spectrum of content moderation strategies ranging from 
“industrial” to “artisanal,” see Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation?, DATA & 
SOCIETY (2018), https://datasociety.net/library/content-or-context-moderation/. There 
are some recent experiments, such as Twitter’s Birdwatch—a pilot in the U.S. of a new 
community-driven approach to help address misleading information”—that allow 
devolved moderation structures within a platform’s larger centralized approach. See 
Keith Coleman, Introducing Birdwatch, a community-based approach to misinformation, 






Nearly all of the major social platforms spell out guidelines for what is considered 
violating content and might be subject to removal or other types of actions.10 Hate 
speech, violent extremism, harassment, nudity, and self-harm are some of the 
many categories often subject to heavy moderation and removal. Some of this 
moderation is mandated by long-standing laws, such as those relating to copyright 
violations (e.g., the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or DMCA),11 while some 
newer laws globally, such as Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, or NetzDG, 
are also increasingly mandating that social media companies remove defamatory 
content and hate speech.12  
 
False claims, lies, misinformation, misleading statements, and other similar 
categories generally are not strictly banned by the platforms themselves unless the 
speech in question may result in harm of some sort. These non-prohibited 
categories are the ones increasingly likely to see “softer” information treatments, 
such as labeling. Labels may be applied that warn users or highlight the disputed 
nature of content (e.g., providing context), and they may rely on and point to 
external authorities such as media organization factcheckers or governmental 
agencies as forms of counterspeech. Informational labels may also be accompanied 
by other social media company actions. For example, on Facebook, a labeling 
treatment when prompted by a fact-check from a third party may also be 
accompanied with algorithmic reduction in visibility to other users or 
downranking of the content in question and any associated URL across the 
platform.13 
 
Almost every platform’s moderation policy leaves room for exceptions based on 
circumstance. Consider this language from the community guidelines of the social 
video sharing platform TikTok:  
 
We recognize that some content that would normally be removed per our 
Community Guidelines could be in the public interest. Therefore, we may 
allow exceptions under certain circumstances, such as educational, 
documentary, scientific, or artistic content, satirical content, content in 
fictional settings, counterspeech, and content in the public interest that is 
 
10 See, e.g., Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-
guidelines/#community-guidelines (last visited Dec. 23, 2020); General Guidelines and 
Policies, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies#general-policies (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2020); Community Standards, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/introduction (last visited Dec. 23, 
2020); Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119/ 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2020); Community Guidelines, TIKTOK, 
https://www.tiktok.com/community-guidelines?lang=en (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
11 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
12 Heidi Tworek & Paddy Leerssen, An Analysis of Germany’s NetzDG Law, (Transatlantic 
High Level Working Group On Content Moderation Online And Freedom Of Expression 
Series, 2019). 






newsworthy or otherwise enables individual expression on topics of social 
importance.14 
 
Many decisions, in other words, involve judgements based on perceived user 
intention, social importance, and cultural context. A given piece of questionable 
content, having been flagged by users or automated systems, typically is sent for 
a first layer of cursory human review. Edge cases are then escalated up to content 
review teams that have increasingly more policy oversight and authority.15 Given 
that large platforms have hundreds of millions or billions of users, however, the 
scale of the content moderation enterprise means that most decisions are the result 
of either algorithms or the briefest human review. Indeed, the COVID-19 
pandemic and the limitations it placed on office-based work led to many 
companies such as Twitter, Google/YouTube, and Facebook/Instagram handing 
over most of their decisions to automated systems.16 After an initial refusal to 
release data about enforcement of community guidelines, companies such as 
YouTube, Twitter, Facebook/Instagram started reporting in 2018 more statistical 
information about their overall moderation efforts. These reports may include the 
total volume of content seeing moderation; the prevalence of categories such as 
hate speech on their platforms; and the degree of preemptive, algorithmic actions 
taken before violating content is widely shared.17 
 
Labeling strategies continue to grow rapidly, in part out of increased pressure 
from the public, policymakers, and potential regulators, as well as out of a 
response to extraordinary events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, electoral 
misinformation, and the violent riots at the U.S Capitol on Jan 6, 2021 that 
attempted to disrupt certification of the country’s election results. For example, 
many social media companies have created policies that limit attempts to interfere 
with election procedure (e.g., providing incorrect time of voting), participation 
(e.g., voter intimidation), or dubious claims relating to fraud.18 Third-party fact-
checkers or authoritative sources are sometimes leveraged to add context on a 
wide variety of these and other kinds of claims. Facebook accompanies various 
fact-checker findings with ratings such as “False,” “Partly False,” “Altered,” or 
“Missing Context,” while many platforms direct users to more reliable health and 
election information sources.  
 
 
14 Community Guidelines: Introduction, TIKTOK (Dec. 2020), 
https://www.tiktok.com/community-guidelines?. 
15 SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA (2019). 
16 Mark Scott & Laura Kayali, What happened when humans stopped managing social media 
content, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/facebook-
content-moderation-automation/.  
17 Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on 
Internet Platforms and Content Moderation, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE 
OF THE FIELD, PROSPECTS FOR REFORM (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020). 
For an example of reporting, see Community Standards Enforcement, FACEBOOK, 
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2020).   
18 Evaluating Platform Election-Related Speech Policies, ELECTION INTEGRITY PARTNERSHIP 




Any major technology platform labeling regime faces the problem of scale. 
Facebook reportedly labeled 180 million messages during the 2020 election season; 
Twitter stated that it labeled 300,000 tweets during roughly the same period.19 Both 
companies have asserted that these labels and warnings resulted in some 
reduction in the spread of misinformation. Other companies, such as YouTube, 
took a less targeted approach with respect to the 2020 U.S. election, putting generic 
labels on a wide variety of election-related content. Taken as a whole, company 
policies are often incompletely and inconsistently applied, as well as contrary to 
one another, resulting in content allowable on one platform subject to removal or 
heavy moderation on another. This is true even in a relatively narrow context, such 
as electoral integrity, where companies are generally aligned on the goal of free 
and fair elections. The policy implementation and tactics employed vary widely.20 
This creates an uncertain epistemic environment for users that can undermine 
trust in a platform's moderation regime, as well as invite accusations of bias, 
favoritism, and censorship.21 
B. Novel media and information ecology 
How did we get to such a situation, where the expressions of billions of people 
around the world are subject to surveillance, filtering, and sometimes, labeling by 
corporations? Understanding the context that helps explain this historically 
peculiar situation is crucial to formulating durable strategic solutions.  
 
Major structural shifts in the nature of communications are forcing new 
discussions about how policies and governance regimes might best preserve 
public interest considerations for twenty-first century speech environments while 
also minimizing harms.22 To be sure, social media companies have themselves 
created many of the novel problems now requiring remedies by their often 
unfettered desire for growth. They have seemingly outstripped their own abilities 
to govern their platforms thoroughly and judiciously, a situation fueled by the 
protections of Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act, which allows 
them to avoid liability for the user-generated content they host.23 These structural 
legal protections have continued to produce negative externalities. Some scholars 
contend Section 230 is at the core of a wide variety of threats to civil rights and 
civil liberties—particularly for those without institutional power and groups often 
 
19  Rachel Lerman & Heather Kelly, Facebook says it labeled 180 million debunked posts ahead 
of the election, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2020) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/19/facebook-election-
warning-labels/; Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, An update on our work around the 
2020 US Elections, TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2020) 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-update.html. 
20 Evaluating Platform Election-Related Speech Policies, supra note 18. 
21 Emily A. Vogels et al., Most Americans Think Social Media Sites Censor Political 
Viewpoints, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 19, 2020) 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-
media-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/. 
22 PHILIP M. NAPOLI, SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: MEDIA REGULATION IN THE 
DISINFORMATION AGE (2019).  




targeted for threats and abuse because of race or gender—and thereby constitutes 
a “discriminatory design” that disadvantages the most vulnerable in society.24 
 
As we enter the third decade of the 21st century, the social media industry stands 
at a crossroads of sorts. There are tradeoffs between seeking to maximally capture 
and monetize attention and seeking to elevate high-quality information to 
minimize harms. The expansive but essentially ethics-free nature of Section 230 
creates a kind of moral void, according to social media employees, and it drives 
the need for companies to articulate their own universal “mission” or “central 
framework,” without which company activity lacks clear orientation.25 Employees 
within Facebook, for example, have been reportedly split bitterly over how to 
balance the demands for growth with the need to maintain informational quality, 
civility, and safety on the platform.26  
 
Social media platforms have ramped up active content moderation efforts in part 
to deal with the fallout from a more polarized political environment. The 
communications spaces they have architected allow both for the expansion of 
democratic conversation but also the rapid proliferation of hate speech, threats, 
abuse, and bullying. Millions of people may be exposed to damaging 
disinformation and misinformation before credible sources can even have the 
chance to provide opposing views, alternatives, and counterspeech. Algorithms, 
or computational mechanisms for curation and selection of content, platform 
designs, and user preferences may also segregate or cocoon people in information 
silos so that they are not exposed to alternative perspectives or corrective 
messages. Harms to society may be realized with such scale and speed that 
traditional safeguards and remedies, namely passively assuming that corrective 
ideas and accurate information from credible speakers will rise up to compete, 
seem inadequate, even naive.27  
 
The scale of social media, the black-box algorithms that they use, the hyper-
personalization of recommendation systems, and the network effects that both 
lock in the dominance of a select few platforms and enable immense cascades of 
viral sharing combine to change the fundamental paradigm of speech 
environments as societies have conventionally understood them. We are quickly 
 
24 Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, in THE PERILOUS PUBLIC SQUARE: 
STRUCTURAL THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION TODAY 181 (David E. Pozen ed., 2020); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Section 230's Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, in THE PERILOUS 
PUBLIC SQUARE, supra at 200. While some have argued for removing the Section 230 
protections, others have suggested that maintaining them (in some form) could be used 
as leverage to require platforms to improve content management and moderation 
practices to promote social goods and values. See Josh Bernoff, Social media broke America. 
Here’s how to fix it, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 18, 2020) 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/12/18/opinion/social-media-broke-america-
heres-how-fix-it/. 
25 Caplan, supra note 8. 
26 Kevin Roose, Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Struggles to Balance Civility and 
Growth, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 24, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/technology/facebook-election-
misinformation.html. 
27 Garrett Morrow et al., The Emerging Science of Content Labeling: Contextualizing Social 





moving away from the controlling ideas for news and information of the twentieth 
century embodied in Justice Holmes’s famous dissent in Abrams v United States 
(1919) that ultimate goods are produced by the “free trade in ideas” within the 
“competition of the market.”28 Confusion and misinformation often win the day, 
with little chance (let alone expectation) for correction or remedy to emerge from 
the current cacophony of ideas and information. From the prevailing idea of 
competition in the marketplace of ideas, we are moving to a paradigm where 
individuals’ orientation and resources for navigating the pitfalls of the 
environment of ideas are becoming paramount.29 This is why greater regard for 
the epistemic position of platform users is so important, and why new forms of 
intermediary interventions—active content moderation approaches—are needed. 
It is no longer reasonable to believe that the marketplace of ideas will sort the true 
from the false, the well-informed from the specious, and the well-intentioned from 
the manipulative.      .  
 
Substantial policy drift—where old rules remain, but source, platform and 
consumption patterns continue to be transformed—has taken place across media 
and communication systems in the United States. 30This would include Section 230, 
enacted years before Facebook, Twitter or YouTube existed. Further, the rise of 
new technologies has meant that traditional forms of verified news and 
knowledge have become less central in terms of public attention, and market 
structure often no longer sufficiently supports the provision of quality news, 
shared public knowledge, or exposure to a variety of perspectives. 31  As 
advertising dollars have moved to online spaces, most have gone to Google and 
Facebook because of their ability to target consumers based on the vast data they 
collect, and traditional news media entities have largely lost out.  
 
During this period of drift, few, if any, policy reforms have been enacted. It should 
be noted that scholars have long anticipated the need to reexamine the controlling 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor and its policy implications, and contemplate a 
need to require new forms of disclosure and context to mitigate the pathologies of 
a more wide-open system of communication.32 Yet it has taken two decades for 
many to realize the extent to which the old paradigm has been overturned. Novel 
problems may now require a substantial rethinking of approaches and policy 
tools.  
 
28 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).  
29 This idea of the need for an increased emphasis on user orientation, online 
cartography, or epistemic positioning has recently been echoed by other theorists. See, 
e.g., WHITNEY PHILLIPS & RYAN M. MILNER, YOU ARE HERE: A FIELD GUIDE FOR 
NAVIGATING POLARIZED SPEECH, CONSPIRACY THEORIES, AND OUR POLLUTED MEDIA 
LANDSCAPE (2020). 
30 For a discussion of the idea of policy drift more broadly, see J.S. Hacker, P. Pierson & 
K.A. Thelen, Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces Of Institutional Change, in ADVANCES IN 
COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 180 (J. Mahoney & K. A. Thelen eds., 2015). 
31 JOHN P. WIHBEY, THE SOCIAL FACT: NEWS AND KNOWLEDGE IN A NETWORKED WORLD 
198-200 (2019). 




C. Moderation and labeling challenges 
Social media companies are now pouring millions, if not billions, of dollars into 
content moderation.33 The new information ecology has created a robust demand 
for speech regulation, one with radically uncertain rules and few historical 
precedents with which to help guide the future. Among other anomalies, there is 
the inherent difficulty of trying to encourage and implement public interest goals 
and standards on what are in effect private company properties. Further, 
companies themselves claim First Amendment protections to defend their right to 
exercise editorial control of their platform content, although these may be asserted 
on questionable grounds.34 
 
As mentioned, companies have available to them a variety of tools for moderation, 
including removal and reduction in visibility to users. Until recently, these two 
approaches were the primary ones employed by companies. But the complexity of 
regulating political speech, and the ambiguities involved, has forced them to adopt 
nimbler and “softer” approaches such as warning labels, knowledge panels, 
source transparency buttons, and other “metadata” instruments, or information 
about information. 35  While a sizable research literature on platform content 
moderation has grown as the social web has expanded over the past 15 years, little 
has been said about content labeling as a comprehensive strategy. Although 
labeling strategies are highly evolved and often sophisticated, the concept is 
immature in other domains such as consumer products, food, pharmaceuticals, 
and even media- and information-driven spaces such as the entertainment 
industry.  
 
There exists a major body of research literature relating to information labeling 
and disclosure in the context of public regulation and governance,36 but few have 
studied how such insights might be operationalized in a social media context. 
Facebook announced in 2016 its initial intention to partner with third-party 
factcheckers, inaugurating a new chapter in the history of online mass content 
labeling. Even the most comprehensive and recent scholarly works37 barely touch 
on labeling as a standalone, substantive issue. Social media companies are just 
beginning to take on board the implications of the relevant psychological research 
literature—the illusory truth effect, the backfire effect, the continued influence 
effect, and the implied truth effect, among others—and related insights about the 
correction of information.38  
 
 
33 Janko Roettgers, Mark Zuckerberg Says Facebook Will Spend More Than $3.7 Billion on 
Safety, Security in 2019, NASDAQ (Feb. 5, 2019, 12:32 PM) 
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/mark-zuckerberg-says-facebook-will-spend-more-
37-billion-safety-security-2019-2019-02-05. 
34 Kyle Langvardt, Platform Speech Governance and the First Amendment: A User-Centered 
Approach (The Digital Social Contract: A Lawfare Paper Series, 2020).  
35 Morrow et al., supra note 27. 
36 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, TOO MUCH INFORMATION: UNDERSTANDING WHAT YOU DON'T WANT 
TO KNOW (2020).  
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There is a strong case to be made that while the companies may have achieved 
occasional tactical successes in limiting the spread of harmful content and 
misinformation, in the process they have fostered mistrust in the system by users, 
undermining the companies’ own efforts and inviting objections of political bias, 
censorship, favoritism, arbitrariness, and amateurism. Media and academic 
observers frequently note that content moderation decisions by the social media 
companies are ad hoc and generally reactive, creating what some have called a 
constant “cycle of shocks and exceptions.”39 Some critics claim that labels are more 
a form of public relations, and less a substantive attempt to deal with the problem 
of misinformation.40  
As reflected by polling data, content moderation strategies have done little to 
engender trust in social media platforms. As of mid-2020, some three-quarters of 
Americans believed that platforms intentionally censor certain political 
viewpoints.41 On questions specific to the labeling of inaccurate information, there 
are deep partisan divisions. Conservative-leaning respondents were 
overwhelmingly likely to doubt the legitimacy and intentions of social media 
labeling efforts while liberal respondents were split in terms of confidence in the 
companies to make these decisions.42 Qualitative research on how users react to 
content moderation decisions relating to their own posts and accounts suggests 
deep and persistent public confusion over policies, motives, and reasons for 
enforcement actions such as content takedowns or account suspensions.43  
Many of the larger problems with content labeling and content moderation are 
about more than just questionable tactical judgments or the optics of particular 
decisions. Rather, the problems are embedded in structural processes and 
upstream systems such as outsourced work of other firms who help with the 
moderation tasks set up by the companies. The algorithms deployed to assist with 
this work can miss large amounts of problematic content—particularly when they 
encounter novel content that does not fit prior patterns of violating content—while 
also generating false positives. The use of, and claims about, artificial intelligence 
by the companies should be subject to scrutiny, both on the grounds of ethics, 
fairness and efficacy, and accuracy.44 The consequences of the more heavy-handed 
content moderation decisions such as takedowns and removal have seen some 
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amount of careful study, although public understanding remains limited because 
of a lack of full transparency about the platforms’ work in this respect.45 
 
Despite the limits of algorithms to date, such computational processes are already 
heavily involved in content labeling regimes, as they are used to track and label, 
for example, COVID-19 or election-related claims. Increasingly, social media 
companies are focusing on the authors of misinformation themselves, who tend to 
be relatively small in number but powerful in their effects on the platform, and 
their networks that often receive, amplify, and engage with this mis- or dis-
information.46 These two trends—the use of algorithms to scale labeling efforts, 
and a focus on users who are persistent “bad actors” and their receiving 
networks— raises the possibility of increased personalization of labeling efforts. 
There is little public evidence yet of social media companies using algorithms to 
differentiate labeling strategies for individual content consumers, such that labels 
seen by one user are not seen by another. But given the social platforms’ ability to 
target and personalize information to users, it would be surprising if more 
personalized and tailored strategies are not being explored.47  
 
Yet the human labor involved in moderation efforts must also remain a key area 
of critical analysis. As mentioned, teams of moderators are often contract workers 
employed by outside firms working under tight timelines. Overall, content 
moderation systems are designed with economic and labor constraints that are 
inadequate to the task of achieving acceptable outcomes. Scholars have explored 
how outsourced, often under-paid workers help to review content and have 
shown how these systems sometimes result in arbitrary decisions with little 
remedy.48 Content moderation teams may need to be significantly expanded and 
the work function raised to a higher-status role within companies.49 
 
However, it should be acknowledged that, as expectations and related regulations 
for content moderation increase, this may create problems and new complexities. 
Although this discussion has focused on large, established platforms, there are 
significant questions about how emerging startups that could challenge 
incumbents might be expected to resource, at increasingly greater expense, content 
moderation efforts. If social media are expected to police their platforms with 
vigilance and consistency from the outset, startup costs may be too high, stifling 
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potential competitors and locking in the advantages of the existing mega-
platforms.50 
 
In sum, social media companies have been struggling to devise and implement 
policies on handling misinformation that the public finds generally palatable. In 
place of consistently enforced policies that are transparent to all parties, the large 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have been handling seemingly piecemeal 
individual instances of misinformation: downranking some posts, removing 
others, and labeling or “fact-checking” still others. This approach has led to social 
blowback, especially in those cases where black-boxed algorithms downrank or 
remove posts for stating what might reasonably be interpreted as political or 
protected speech.  
 
Given the need for these platforms to keep their users happy enough with content 
moderation policies, it seems likely that the platforms will lean more and more 
heavily on labeling misinformation, as opposed to removing it or burying it. It 
appeals as a “middle way” solution for political speech that flags misinformation 
without fully censoring it, for example, while reliance on third party fact checkers 
dislocates some of the responsibility from the platforms. It is also, in some respects, 
the most transparent of the available strategies. It involves providing additional 
information to users, rather than eliminating or hiding content, and the label and 
intervention are manifest to users. In contrast, downranking content is a complete 
black box from the user’s perspective and reduces visibility, while censorship is 
by its very nature opaque.51  
 
There is a growing sentiment that, as Tarleton Gillespie has advocated, “Platforms 
should make a radical commitment to turning the data they already have back to 
[users] in a legible and actionable form, everything they could tell me contextually 
about why a post is there and how I should assess it.”52 Yet if misinformation is 
not labeled by these platforms according to a transparent and consistently 
enforced policy, surely the public will not be much better off. The many problems 
associated with moderating content on social media platforms suggest that a larger 
strategic review of the entire problem space is in order. There is a pressing need 
for a richer and more systematic set of ideas and approaches. This begins with a 
clear articulation of the goals for the strategy. What, exactly, is the content 
moderation regime meant to accomplish?  
 
 
50 Tarleton Gillespie et al., Expanding the debate about content moderation: Scholarly research 
agendas for the coming policy debates, 9 Internet Pol’y Rev. 1 (2020). 
51 To be clear, the point here is that labeling is more transparent than alternative 
strategies, not that labeling is free from any concerns over transparency. See Harrison 
Mantas, Fact-checkers support Twitter labels, but more than that, they want transparency, 
POYNTER (May 29, 2020) https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2020/fact-checkers-
support-twitter-labels-but-more-than-that-they-want-transparency/. 
52 T. GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND 





2. Embracing value in content moderation: What are the underlying values and 
ultimate goals of the moderation regime? 
 
The considerations discussed above point to the need for a systematic approach to 
content moderation. In what follows we develop a possible strategic framework 
for content moderation, including informational quality labeling that involves: 
articulating the moderation strategies’ goals (and values that underlie them); 
characterizing the intermediate epistemic aims to accomplish the goals; and 
identifying ethical considerations (e.g., respect, free speech, equality, justice) that 
should inform strategies in pursuit of epistemic aims. In this section we argue that 
developing such an approach requires relinquishing certain myths about platform 
neutrality.  
 
Social media platforms are designed to be open. (We are here distinguishing 
network and sharing platforms from more private communication-oriented 
messaging apps, such as WhatsApp.) The build of the techno-social system is 
fundamentally oriented toward an increase in users and quantity of information, 
an increase in connections between users, and facilitation of the movement (or 
access or sharing) of information across users. What makes them, fundamentally, 
social media platforms seems to favor a presumption or default in favor of 
allowing information and smoothing its sharing. At the policy level, the result is 
an onus or burden of justification on restricting information and spread.53 It is why 
the platforms tend to adopt harm-principle oriented policies. This is illustrated in 
Facebook’s policy that highlights two primary aims: freedom of expression (the 
default of openness) and avoidance of harm (the consideration that can overcome 
the presumption of openness).54 But it also means that content moderation based 
on information quality is at odds with the design and orientation of not only the 
companies, but the technologies. Founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg is quite clear 
that Facebook the company does not want to be the arbiters of truth; 55  and 
Facebook the techno-social system is designed in a way that resists evaluating 
informational quality. Their professed ideal is neutrality. 
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world, and to share and express what matters to them.” Resources: FAQ’s, FACEBOOK 
INVESTOR RELATIONS (2019) https://investor.fb.com/resources/. Twitter states: “The 
mission we serve as Twitter, Inc. is to give everyone the power to create and share ideas 
and information instantly without barriers. Our business and revenue will always follow 
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54 See Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 17, 
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Social media companies are not the first information institutions to try to take this 
position. Libraries are information repositories and access systems that have at 
times embraced the idea of information quality neutrality.56 Some have argued 
that the role of libraries should be to make information available, and then leave it 
up to citizens and patrons to determine what is true or false. On this view, labeling 
for informational quality is seen as a kind of “censorship” because it intervenes 
between the seeker of information and the source of information. It inserts the 
librarian's views to influence the seeker’s views. (There are echoes of this in the 
claim that labeling tweets is a kind of censorship, and that retweeting is not an 
endorsement.) But library neutrality with respect to information is untenable for 
at least two interrelated reasons: quantity and organization. There is more 
information than libraries can make equally available. Therefore, librarians must 
make decisions about what should be in their holdings, as well as which of their 
holdings will be made more prominent or easily accessible. The second is that in 
order to help patrons navigate the vast amount of information, they organize it by 
category (or directional labeling). They make judgements about what is fiction, 
what is reference, what is philosophy, what is science, what is research, what is 
propaganda, and so on. Even if they do not make judgments on the factual 
accuracy of information, managing the information system requires making 
judgments about what kind of information each item is.  
 
The analog with social media platforms is clear. The sheer volume of information 
makes strict informational quality neutrality impossible. It is not possible to just 
present all the information and let users decide what is true (which, as argued 
earlier, is also a misconception of the epistemology of social media platforms that 
belies the “marketplace of ideas” framing of the information environment). And, 
in fact, the platforms algorithmically curate information all the time. The search 
engines, recommendation systems, and advertising systems all do this in some 
form. And how they are oriented is determined by what is valued (or their 
proxies), such as generating more connections, site clicks, or revenue. Similarly, 
the user interfaces are designed to organize and present information in a particular 
format and structure. Users have some discretion over what they see—just as 
library patrons have discretion over how they navigate a library (or its website)—
but there are background design decisions that shape the experience, influence 
decisions, and define the limits of choice. In libraries they involve such things as 
subject categorization and search resources. On social media, they are the 
interfaces, settings, and connection options available to users. There are values 
related to informational importance and quality, as well as to informational 
exposure and control, designed in the systems no matter what, given the sheer 
volume and need for organization. Companies cannot claim neutrality with 
respect to informational quality and importance as a privileged basis for building 
a content moderation system. It is an old point that values are inseparable from 
the design of technological systems.57 But in this context it is worth emphasizing 
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that this applies in particular to values related to quality and importance of 
information.  
 
We take this to have two implications. First, the current content moderation model 
is founded on a false presumption that informational neutrality is the starting 
point and ideal from which moderation deviates and so requires justification. 
Second, a systematic approach to content moderation—including informational 
quality labeling—begins with an explicit statement of the goals of and values that 
underlie the content moderation regime. 
 
Our project here is not to make an argument for particular values or goals that 
content moderation systems should take. But there are some clear candidates from 
content moderation policies and recent events, such as increasing connectivity 
while avoiding harms to individuals (these are the ones recognized by many of 
the platforms); maintaining basic social and democratic institutions and practices 
(or public sphere/decency); reducing racism, sexism, and discriminatory 
ideologies and practices; amplifying the voice and social impact of people from 
traditionally marginalized groups; and avoiding collective or social harms. Once 
the ultimate values or goals of the content moderation system are set, then the 
question becomes how to accomplish or realize them within the system. Here we 
believe the social epistemological perspective is crucial. When thinking about 
realizing the goals, it is important to ask how the features of the system can be 
modified in order to improve the epistemological position of interacting agents 
(along with their information environments and their behaviors/judgments) to 
accomplish these goals or aims.  
 
3. The need for a social epistemic approach 
A. What is a social epistemic approach? 
Any systematic and consistent content moderation strategy must first of all be 
grounded by one or more social values that the strategy aims to promote. But 
content labeling is essentially an epistemic intervention; it is information about 
information, and so by its very nature, it must promote those social values by 
making individuals or communities epistemically better off—i.e., by changing 
their epistemic positions in a way that protects or promotes the ultimate values. 
As discussed above, when a content moderation regime is overly tactical and 
reactive it increases confusion, mistrust, and charges of bias—i.e., it does not 
systematically improve users’ epistemic positions. Moreover, social media 
platform tactics are driven by an unrealistically individualistic understanding of 
the epistemic contexts and behaviors of their users. Most of the ways in which 
social media undermines people’s epistemic positions are inherently social. The 
spread of misinformation and fake news are clearly social phenomena, as are the 
information bubbles and echo chambers users can become trapped within. Such 
bubbles and chambers tend to erode trust in legitimate sources, limit exposure to 
alternative views, obscure legitimate expertise, confuse which forms of testimony 
are evidential, and diminish common knowledge and shared discourse (thereby 
increasing informational polarization).58 Any proper content moderation strategy 
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must therefore understand the epistemic concerns in a corresponding way. There 
are thus two intertwined ways in which the epistemic goals of labeling are social. 
One is that many of the epistemic outcomes sought are for groups (or for 
individuals as parts of groups or as they relate to other people)—e.g., avoiding the 
creation of epistemic bubbles and the erosion of common or shared knowledge. 
The other is that the social structure of the information system informs what is 
effective in accomplishing those epistemic outcomes.             
 
This way of thinking in social terms about epistemic interventions is, relatively 
speaking, a recent advance in the field of epistemology. Besides a few notable 
exceptions,59 the study of norms of human thought, rationality, justification, and 
knowledge prior to the 1980s tended to focus on the sole inquirer, attempting to 
build her bank of knowledge from the evidence she had been given by the world 
itself. Scientists tended to be thought of as isolated individuals, reasoning about 
nature on their own, and fully outside of any embedded social context. Little 
attention was given to the fact that most of what humans know they know from 
the testimony of others, which became an intense topic of debate starting in the 
1980s. In the last few decades, epistemologists have recognized that most of what 
we think, rationally believe, or know for certain traces back to facts about our 
social circumstances, like whom we talk to, whom we work with, who we take to 
be experts, how we have been taught to reason by our mentors or society, and our 
informational positions and relationships. 60  In other words, we are inherently 
social inquirers and believers through and through. What we believe, the grounds 
on which we believe it, and what we know for sure are all features of the particular 
social epistemic landscape within which we live.61 
 
To bring out the limitations of thinking of the epistemic issues in overly 
individualistic terms, take the following example. In the late summer of 2020, 
Facebook ramped up its efforts to label posts containing misinformation about 
COVID-19, examining countless posts and flagging those containing explicitly 
debunked information. In those cases where posts contained mitigation strategies 
that conflicted with CDC guidance, context labels were applied, directing users to 
the CDC’s information, on the presumption that users would see the latter as more 
reliable. The stated aim of these moves was to have fewer individual users exposed 
to those individual pieces of information. In public statements, Facebook seemed 
to measure success by the volume of content that was caught and labeled, and by 
how much the spread of those particular pieces of misinformation was slowed. 
But, as watchdog organizations have pointed out,62 this labeling strategy wasn’t 
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able to contain the spread of bogus cures (like Vitamin C),63 conspiracy theories 
concerning the origin of the virus (like the 5G conspiracy theory), 64  or anti-
vaccination information.65 What is more, a very large number of platform users 
seem to still be unable to tell experts from novices, good evidence from weak 
evidence, or good advice from poor advice on COVID-19 scientific information, 
and very many have continued to make extremely poor decisions because of it.   
 
Once we move our thinking of content labeling regimes from tactical over to 
strategic terms, and then ground the strategy in more basic social values, it 
becomes easier to see that we must think of the epistemic effects of a labeling 
strategy in social terms as well—e.g., whom to trust, the testimony of others, 
recognizing expertise, and inferring from the beliefs of others. For example, social 
media platforms have arguably made it more difficult for members of society to 
tell who the experts are on a particular topic.66 Users seem to have become worse 
at discerning between a piece of testimony that they ought to trust from one that 
they ought to discard.67 This is at least partly because users share information 
widely with other users without checking the information for accuracy, thus 
flouting a long-standing norm for making public assertions. 68  Users are often 
presented with information from an increasingly homogenous set of viewpoints.69 
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Those who end up getting fed up with a moderation regime, perhaps because they 
see it as being politically motivated, might in turn move to a different platform, 
thus limiting their exposure to an even more homogenous set of views, 
exacerbating epistemic bubbles and echo chambers.70  
 
One consequence of these social-level features of each user’s information 
ecosystem is that many people end up with deeply flawed beliefs both on certain 
facts about the world that are relevant to their decision-making, but also deeply 
flawed beliefs about whether other people agree with them and share their 
values.71 This is evident in some Trump supporters’ beliefs that Trump could not 
have lost the election without there having been massive fraud, since the vast 
majority of people that they are exposed to support him and the vast majority of 
media that they consume support fraud allegations. The deeply social nature of 
the epistemic situation on social media is central to these kinds of problems.  
 
Re-orienting ourselves toward a more social understanding of the epistemic 
situation also allows us to see a number of social epistemic benefits that platforms 
could leverage. For example, social epistemologists have long pointed out that 
groups of agents can combine to generate epistemic goods that no individual 
inside the group is capable of (familiar cases are the “wisdom of the crowds” or 
instances of group knowledge).72 More recently, network epistemologists have 
been working on ways to modify social networks in order to increase the 
likelihood of obtaining certain epistemic goals. 73  And as Neil Levy and Mark 
Alfano have convincingly argued, human history is filled with advances in 
knowledge that seem to be spawned by epistemically problematic behavior if we 
were to look just at individual inquirers.74 A more social understanding of the 
problem might also suggest alternative labeling or context-providing strategies, 
such as reliability ratings for sharers or sources of information (based on their 
history) or designing systems so that sharing (or retweeting) requires users to be 
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clear about whether they are actually endorsing what they share.75 Our suggestion 
here is that if a content labeling strategy were to respect the deeply social aspects 
of the epistemic situation with which it is wrapped up, it would not only be able 
to avoid the various pitfalls of a more individualistic approach but may also be 
able to generate epistemic benefits that would have been missed by an 
individualistic, tactical approach. Or, to put it another way, a strategic social 
epistemology approach is not focused on individual pieces of information or even 
individual judgments or beliefs about them. It concerns the epistemic relationships 
and situations of the users collectively.  
 
B. Case study for the social epistemic approach: Trump v. Twitter 
 
In order to gain a better grasp of what it means and why it is important to take a 
social epistemology perspective and approach to content moderation, consider 
again the example of Twitter labeling as “disputed” and potentially “misleading” 
President Trump's tweets claiming that he had really won the 2020 presidential 
election and that there had been widespread voter fraud to steal it from him. 
Twitter suggested that its 2020 election-related labels limited user sharing of 
misinformation, “due in part to a prompt that warned people prior to sharing.”76 
Here one can see that Twitter is suggesting that the labels were efficacious in 
reducing the spread of the false claims.77 
 
Even assuming this is true, that the labels significantly reduced retweeting and so 
reduced the spread of the president’s misinformation, Twitter’s rationale and 
approach nevertheless amount to what we have referred to as a very 
individualistic and tactical way of thinking about the misinformation problem and 
what counts as a solution. From a social epistemology perspective, the question is 
not how many people on the platform were exposed to the tweet. It is how the 
labeling changed their epistemic position—and not just about their credence with 
respect to that particular piece of information. Here are some questions to ask: Did 
people who were exposed to not just this labelled tweet but a series of them begin 
to think differently about how reliable the President was about election 
information? If so, was it an improvement with respect to their ability to discern 
misinformation from reliable information? If labels do not change how people 
structure their information environment, improve their ability to discern 
misinformation, and lead them to trust more reliable (and mistrust less reliable) 
sources, then the fact that labelled tweets were viewed less frequently than they 
would have otherwise been is not an epistemic success. In fact, if persistent robust 
labeling leads people to become more discriminating in a way that improves their 
ability to identify misinformation, then reducing the exposure to labeled 
misinformation is actually not an epistemic good. Or, to put it another way, the 
 
75 Rini, supra note 59; Rachel Sterken et al., On Retweeting (2019) (Manuscript, 
forthcoming).  
76 An Update on Our Work around the 2020 US Elections, TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2020) 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-update.html. 
77 Paul Mena, Cleaning Up Social Media: The Effect of Warning Labels on Likelihood of Sharing 
False News on Facebook, 12 Pol’y & Internet 165 (2020; Geoffrey A. Fowler, Twitter and 






challenge from a social epistemology perspective is not “how to make truth travel 
faster than lies,”78 it is how to improve people's ability to distinguish truth from 
lies in a socially networked informational context.  
 
Major platforms—e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Youtube—ultimately suspended 
Trump’s accounts in the wake of the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol on 
the basis of inciting violence.79 This is clear evidence of the failure of their content 
moderation approaches. The labeling tactics they employed to combat 
misinformation around the election were ineffectual, and their broader content 
moderation policies (including the recommendation systems and hyper-
personalization they use) fostered radicalization and the growth of white 
nationalist extremist groups that were central to the riots. 80  The still ongoing 
situation demonstrates the importance of thinking about content moderation from 
a long-term strategic social epistemology perspective. By the time the platforms 
began to tactically label Trump's posts, the epistemic damage had already been 
done. Those who were sympathetic to him trusted his claims—even in the absence 
of supporting evidence and the presence of countervailing evidence, and even 
with extensive reliable expert testimony and confirmation from numerous vetting 
and auditing processes. They were situated in epistemic bubbles and echo 
chambers that continually reinforced their views. They disbelieved platform labels 
and distrusted fact-checkers and independent news organizations. By not having 
had a long-term, value-grounded, consistent, clearly articulated labeling strategy 
(and broader moderation strategy), the social epistemic situation was such that ad 
hoc tactical labeling was bound to fail.  
 
In fact, from a social epistemological perspective, banning Trump from the 
platforms appears to have had limited effect thus far. His core supporters’ 
epistemic situation has not significantly improved, and the bans have reinforced 
many of their epistemic priors about bias, conspiracy, and who to trust. Again, the 
moderation problem is not best understood by focusing on individual posts or 
numbers of views, but by the sort of epistemic contexts and relationships that 
platform designs, policies, and interventions have helped to build both on and 
beyond the platforms. Views of Trump's posts on the platforms that have banned 
him have gone to zero, but the more important question in evaluating the ban’s 
effectiveness is how this has impacted the problematic epistemic environment that 
enables conspiracy theories, election misinformation, and hate groups to prosper. 
Still more important is how to begin to strategically build a content moderation 
and labeling regime over the long-term that will create a better social epistemic 
environment and enable effective tactical interventions when future need arises.81   
 
78 Geoffrey A. Fowler, supra note 78. 
79 Facebook Newsroom (@fbnewsroom), TWITTER (Jan. 7, 2021, 11:01 AM) 
https://twitter.com/fbnewsroom/status/1347211647245578241. 
80 Jeff Horwitz & Keach Hagwy, Parler Makes Play for Conservatives Mad at Facebook, 
Twitter, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 15, 2020, 1:05 AM) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/parler-backed-by-mercer-family-makes-play-for-
conservatives-mad-at-facebook-twitter-11605382430. 
81 Of course, one way to begin to do this is to audit how the current problematic 
epistemic environment arose, such as the rabbit-holes toward radical content that 
recommendation systems often create, the ambiguities of meaning and responsibility 
around retweeting, the inconsistency of the “newsworthy” exemption, the design 





Slowing the spread of lies relative to truth on this or that platform might be a 
means to accomplishing the goal of improving a user’s ability to distinguish truth 
from lies online, but a lot would depend on the details. If people’s epistemic 
position is not improved, and they instead jump to a different platform with even 
less content moderation, then that is not success. If suppression or other attempts 
to mitigate lead people to strengthen their convictions about conspiracies and 
misinformation (as one might expect due to the self-sealing nature of conspiracy 
theorizing),82 then that is not success.83 It is social epistemic success that is needed, 
and that might mean more robust labels with links to correct sources are preferable 
to suppression.84 Or, to put this another way, it is not the spread of lies that is itself 
the epistemic problem, it is the way in which those lies lead people to believe more 
false and fewer true things in the future on the basis of the relational aspects of 
networked information exposure, and then the personal and social costs 
associated with that.85 
 
What is an alternative, social epistemological measure to misinformation spread 
of whether labeling strategies are effective? We offer a number, which are not 
intended to be exhaustive:  
 
1) A change in the ratio of posts containing verifiable information to those 
containing misinformation.86  
 
 
unrelenting personalization of content that erodes shared knowledge, the absence of a 
consistent, intelligible and research-based labeling strategy, and so on. 
82 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures, 17 J. Pol. 
Phil. 202 (2009). 
83 Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and 
Successful Debiasing, 13 Psych. Sci. 106 (2012).  
84 Morrow et al., supra note 27, summarizes the extant research literature and concludes: 
“[A] label should directly refute the misinformation, provide an alternative explanation if 
available, and provide a detailed explanation with regard to why it is false. The label 
may be more effective if it comes from someone ideologically aligned with the recipient 
and includes graphical elements, or other aesthetic elements in line with the affordances 
and usage practices of the platform’s content.”; Briony Swire-Thompson & David Lazer, 
Public health and online misinformation: challenges and recommendations, 41 Ann. Rev. Pub. 
Health 433 (2020); Briony Swire-Thompson et al., Searching for the backfire effect: 
Measurement and design considerations, 9 J. Appl. Res. Mem. Cogn. 286 (2020). 
85 It is not just that more people believe that Trump won, but also that fewer people are as 
confident as they ought to be that Biden did, which imposes costs on the democratic 
process. These include costs to news agencies which might need to trim important 
content in order to spend time debunking the misinformation, possibly causing a drop in 
viewership; costs to the public officials who are targeted by false rumors or even full 
blown conspiracy theories; and costs to overall standards of social discourse and civic 
engagement, as well as democratic processes and values.  
86 There have been various calls to change the verifiable information-misinformation ratio 
through much greater knowledge curation by the social media companies. For example, 
see Hanaa' Tameez, Beyond “yellow banners on websites”: How to restore moral and technical 






2) Whether users become better judges of genuine expertise on the topics as 
evidenced through their linking, liking, or visiting behavior.  
 
3) Whether users curate their information environment differently with 
respect to who they follow, unfollow, or block.  
 
4) Whether users are exposed to or seek out a wider range of viewpoints on 
those topics that are still under legitimate dispute.  
 
5) How users alter their sharing behavior (e.g., retweeting) with respect to 
misinformation (e.g., do they increasingly identify it as such?).  
 
What measure is appropriate to use will depend in part on what social values the 
content labeling strategy is designed to promote. For example, if the social values 
require that individuals have accurate beliefs about some subset of factual matters, 
then the relevant measure will certainly have to take into account whether users 
of the platform end up with more accurate beliefs on that subject matter as they 
engage with the platform. On the other hand, if the social values require that 
individuals take seriously the beliefs and viewpoints of users from opposing sides 
of the political spectrum, whether users end up having inaccurate beliefs about the 
former subject matter might be less relevant. In short, which epistemic goals a 
content labeling strategy ought to promote will depend on the ultimate social 
purpose the strategy was designed to accomplish, and that will in turn inform 
what measures should be used to evaluate candidate strategies.87 This process is 
largely an empirical matter. It is an empirical question whether this or that content 
labeling strategy really does make the resulting information ecosystem better or 
worse on that chosen metric.  
 
To be clear, the empirical studies to distinguish which is the epistemically 
preferable strategy and measures are nascent,88  and therefore we are not in a 
position to settle these issues (in addition to the fact that we are not here endorsing 
any particular social goals). The point is that how to understand the problem and 
what constitutes success with respect to addressing it depends on the way it is 
analyzed, and that insights from a social epistemological perspective offer crucial 
perspectives on the problem. (Also, to be clear, our point is not that it is the only 
useful one, nor is it to deny that reducing the spread of misinformation is often 
also important.) We are not the first to make the point that a social epistemology 
perspective should be central to analysis of and responses to online 
misinformation.89 But our hope is that the preceding discussion elucidates what it 
means to approach informational quality content moderation from a social 
 
87 It is important to note that these empirical questions also need to account for the 
international reach of content moderation policies. One might predict that large 
corporations stationed in a certain nation, such as Facebook with America, might focus 
on the effects their moderation regime has on users hailing from the same nation. As is 
now well accepted, however, psychological effects often differ from nation to nation, and 
thus it would be a mistake to base policies with international reach on studies that lack it. 
See, e.g., Joseph Henrich et al., The Weirdest People in the World?, 33 Behav. & Brain Sci. 61 
(2010).  
88 Morrow et al., supra note 27. 
89 Rini, supra note 59; Nguyen, supra note 59; Fallis and Mathiesen, supra note 59; Sterken 




epistemology perspective, and demonstrates how it provides a useful perspective 
for analyzing the problem of content moderation and developing and evaluating 
candidate approaches to addressing it.  
 
4. Incorporating normative considerations into a content moderation regime 
 
The strategic approach to informational labeling that we have advocated begins 
with clearly articulating the moderation regime’s goals (what it is meant to 
accomplish) and guiding values (why it is meant to do so). Once these are 
articulated, then it is possible to inquire (from a social epistemology perspective) 
how the epistemic position of users could be improved through informational 
labeling to accomplish those goals. Content moderation strategies and policies can 
then be developed and assessed (using appropriate measures) for realizing those 
epistemic improvements.  
 
However, there are considerations that must inform evaluation of candidate 
labeling policies and strategies, which go beyond their efficacy in improving users' 
social epistemic position according to well defined metrics. Some of these 
considerations are practical or concern feasibility. Whatever the strategy is, it must 
be scalable and timely, for example. Given the volume of content to review, this 
suggests that there will be an automated or algorithmic component. As discussed 
earlier, there are significant unanswered questions (which we are not addressing 
here) about how to do this effectively and responsibly. Companies’ impulses to try 
to make the moderation process more efficient and less susceptible to human bias 
and error—fueled by technical advances in machine learning/artificial 
intelligence (ML/AI) and natural language processing (NLP), as well as computer 
vision—will make the ever-increasing use of automation tempting to the platform 
companies. However, scholars continue to have concerns that, in fact, AI will 
amplify existing biases and perpetuate systemic injustices, and that deep-learning 
algorithms and the like are far less effective than technologists would claim in their 
ability to grapple with nuanced, often novel, content.90   
 
But other considerations are less practical and more normative. A strategy might 
be epistemically beneficial but nevertheless be contrary to legal or ethical norms. 
Imagine that a platform implemented a system that downranked (or negatively 
labeled) posts by people who subscribe to or are regularly exposed to information 
from some particular media ecosystem because it (the algorithmic system) learned 
 
90 Ifeoma Ajunwa, The paradox of automation as anti-bias intervention, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 54 
(2020); Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns & Christian Katzenbach, Algorithmic content 
moderation: Technical and political challenges in the automation of platform governance, 3 Big 
Data & Soc’y 1 (2020). As alluded to earlier (Section 1C), one potential application of 
these sorts of algorithms in the context of labeling could be to use them to try to predict 
what sorts of informational quality labels are likely to be most effective for different 
groups of people in different contexts. That is, it might be possible to employ the sort of 
algorithmic, data-driven personalization currently used to optimize for engagement with 
advertisements and products to optimize for engagement with information quality labels 
and corrective information (e.g., fact-checkers and authoritative sources) as part of an 
attempt to accomplish positive epistemic outcomes. However, it is important to 
recognize that concerns over ML/AI generated informational biases could arise if 
labeling regimes are algorithmically personalized and tailored to each particular 




that people who are thus connected tend to share scientific and election 
misinformation at a high rate. Imagine, further, that the media ecosystem has a 
particular political orientation. Even if the moderation system was not 
intentionally designed to slow information spread from individuals who subscribe 
or are otherwise exposed to that ecosystem—and even assuming it effectively 
accomplished the goal of slowing the spread of uncontextualized scientific and 
election misinformation that erodes people’s epistemic position—there could 
nevertheless be concerns on other grounds. One concern might be on grounds of 
bias: if the moderation system slowed not only the targeted misinformation but 
also other non-targeted information or views from those sources and users. 
Another concern might be that it does not treat users on the basis of their own 
behavior, but instead makes judgments on the basis of informational relationships. 
It epistemically downgrades users whether or not they themselves are purveyors 
of misinformation by reducing their ability to share information, based on the 
algorithmic determination that they are the type of user (based on their 
informational associations) that is likely to do so. In some (but not all) contexts, 
this sort of judging based on grouping is problematic,91 and it may be so when it 
involves restricting or limiting speech. For this reason, such a strategy—one that 
labels on the basis of informational association—might in some contexts be less 
desirable than one that is oriented around users’ own information behaviors. 
 
There are, in fact, a host of normative considerations relevant to evaluating 
candidate strategies. Concerns about bias, fairness, censorship, respect, autonomy, 
rights, accessibility, and equality need to be taken into account. A strategy that is 
epistemically effective in general or over a large population of users might treat 
some groups of users differently—for example, labeling their posts at a higher rate 
or having a higher rate of mislabels—and so be problematic.92 It might not respect 
the autonomy of users or treat them as individuals in contexts when doing so is 
required. It might marginalize some persons’ or groups’ information or 
perspectives without warrant. It might be comparatively ineffective at reducing 
misinformation about particular groups of people. It might place undue burdens 
or costs on some people or groups (e.g., with excessive exposure to corrections or 
labels), and so on.93 
 
91 Daniel Susser, Predictive Policing and the Ethics of Preemption, in THE ETHICS OF POLICING: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE (Ben Jones & Eduardo Mendieta eds., NYU Press) 
(forthcoming).  
92 A number of moderation efforts have turned out to be biased against groups whose 
information behaviors and speech deviates from those on which algorithms are trained 
or standards developed. This is an area where content moderation is subject to the same 
sorts of algorithmic bias concerns, such as unrepresentative training data and disparate 
impacts, that arise in other contexts, such as criminal justice, education, and social 
services. A rich critical literature has documented these problems across numerous 
domains. See Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules 
Protect White Men from Hate Speech But Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2017, 5 
AM) https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-
documents-algorithms; SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH 
ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); Mona Sloane & Emanuel Moss, AI’s social sciences 
deficit, 1 Nature Machine Intelligence 330 (2019); RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER 
TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE (2019); MEREDITH BROUSSARD, 
ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD (2018). 
93 For in depth treatments of related concerns over epistemic distributive justice see Faik 





The aim here is not to articulate the full range of normative considerations, let 
alone substantively specify them to the extent that they could be used to evaluate 
concrete strategies. That is well beyond the scope of this paper; however, we do 
want to emphasize, following Kay Mathiesen’s work on informational justice, that 
when conducting an ethical analysis to identify potential normative 
considerations regarding the impacts of information systems on people and 
groups, it is necessary to take into account the seekers of information (i.e., the 
content consumers), the sources of information (e.g., the posters and sharers), and 
the subjects of information (i.e., individuals that posts or claims are about);94 and 
that here, too, a social epistemology perspective is helpful because the way in 
which content moderation works is by altering informational relationships and 
epistemic positions.  
 
As discussed above, it may be morally problematic if a content labeling strategy 
treated content consumers from certain groups substantially differently than 
others. There are a number of different ways in which such strategies do wrong to 
those seekers who are treated worse than others, particularly if it is members of a 
protected and typically marginalized group who are made epistemically worse off 
or if legitimate political/public speech or dissent is suppressed or marginalized.95 
Strategies arguably can also do wrong to information seekers by making members 
of certain other groups disproportionately better-off (even if no users are made 
straightforwardly worse-off). For example, if a content labeling strategy leaves less 
educated individuals in roughly the same epistemic situation, while drastically 
improving the epistemic position of those with more education, this also seems, at 
least prima facie, to be of concern. If the platform has access to a slightly non-
optimal strategy that also raises less educated seekers, then that may be a strong 
enough consideration to favor adopting the less-optimal option. In short, many of 
the same kinds of concerns over distributional justice can also apply to 
distributions of epistemic goods for information seekers. Distributive justice and 
fairness are of course not the only normative consideration regarding seekers of 
information—concerns related to seeker autonomy are also relevant, for 
example—but it illustrates the need to respect and consider content consumers, 
and not just content sources, in evaluating candidate strategies and policies.   
 
Respecting the sources of information, which in the social media context tend to 
be those creating or sharing information with their posts, also generates normative 
considerations relevant to evaluating content labeling policies and strategies. 
Perhaps the most commonly discussed instance of this involves censorship and 
speech rights. These are most often framed as concerns about the treatment of 
informational sources. (Censorship can also be framed in terms of information 
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access from the perspective of information seekers.) However, taking an epistemic 
approach reveals other normative considerations. One such consideration, which 
has been highlighted in the social epistemology literature, stems from concerns 
over what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” (Although, the general 
idea was raised in much earlier work by feminist women of color).96 The large and 
quickly growing literature on this kind of epistemic injustice documents the many 
ways in which people from marginalized groups—e.g., women, non-binary 
persons, people of color, children, overweight people, the elderly, people with 
disabilities, etc.—are often treated differently, and are very often disadvantaged, 
as sources of information. The root issue is that individuals who belong to these 
groups tend to be treated by others as much less reliable as sources of information 
than they, in fact, are. Based on this literature, it seems likely that content labels 
could have differential effects depending on the demographic characteristics of the 
sources of the information. For example, a corrective content label applied to a 
piece of misinformation posted by a wealthy, adult, white male might generally 
be disregarded, while a content label applied to a piece of misinformation posted 
by a younger, non-wealthy woman of color might cause users to discredit that 
information at a higher rate. In short, some content labeling strategies may 
exacerbate forms of epistemic injustice that have already been well documented, 
and this should be considered when evaluating which strategies platforms should 
use. Lastly, if a labeling strategy itself treats sources of information belonging to 
protected demographic categories in substantially detrimental ways, as some have 
argued has already occurred with other content moderation strategies along racial 
lines,97 this would obviously also raise moral concerns.  
 
Lastly, there are also legitimate normative concerns that are related to how subjects 
of information are affected by a content labeling strategy. For example, if 
falsehoods posted about White subjects of stories are labeled more frequently than 
falsehoods posted about Black subjects of stories, then the approach is biased. As 
mentioned, it is well documented that algorithmic systems can be biased in 
numerous ways and for numerous reasons, and this applies as well to labeling or 
moderation algorithms. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there is often a human 
element to many content moderation efforts. The fact that individuals tend to 
harbor unconscious biases against members of certain groups is well established, 
and such biases will creep into content moderation efforts. When there are biases 
in labeling—algorithmic and/or human—they generate epistemic biases. Some 
people, perspectives, or information are epistemically disadvantaged within the 
system, for example, by being misrepresented or limited in their ability to 
represent themselves (and so compromising their autonomy).  
 
These are just sketches of some normative considerations that arise when 
evaluating content moderation, and information labeling in particular, from a 
social epistemology and informational justice perspective. They are by no means 
exhaustive. Moreover, as indicated above, our aim here is to present an approach 
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for strategic use of content labeling—one oriented around social epistemology—
and indicate some of the ways in which that approach can be helpful for 
elucidating the challenge and developing strategies and policies for addressing it. 
There are other critical perspectives that are useful and other normative 
considerations that are relevant in addition to those discussed here. The crucial 
point is that those who wish to develop a robust, systematic content moderation 
strategy will have to take into account normative and value considerations at 
several levels. One is in defining the goals of the regime and the values that 
underlie them. Many of these will be social goods and values, in addition to the 
value of individual expression and the avoidance of harms. Another is in 
evaluating the impacts of candidate strategies to accomplish those goals on 
individuals and groups, including those individuals and groups living in lands 
very far removed from the developers or implementers of the strategies. In this 
section we have tried to motivate the importance of analyzing these impacts from 
the perspective of respect for seekers, subjects, and sources of the information 
being moderated, as well as the importance of including a social epistemology 
perspective.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
We have tried to elucidate a strategic way of framing the problem of online content 
moderation, one that is grounded in analyzing the problem through the lens of 
social epistemology. The framework we are proposing involves: identifying and 
articulating the ultimate goals (and the values that underlie them) to be 
accomplished by the moderation strategy; determining what epistemic impacts 
(changes to information context and agents’ capacity to navigate it) are needed to 
accomplish those goals; developing normatively informed strategies and tools to 
accomplish those epistemic aims (and evaluating them accordingly). We have 
highlighted several ways in which taking this approach might inform, and in some 
cases improve, content moderation in general, and informational quality labeling 
in particular. 
 
● Consistency and coherence: The largely reactive and piecemeal approach to 
content moderation policy and practice is an underlying cause of a number 
of difficulties in content moderation. Charges of bias and favoritism arise. 
Moderation activities appear ad hoc. There is overall a lack of coherence in 
the discourse and practice around content moderation. It is difficult to 
argue tactics—what works, what does not, what is acceptable—when the 
end goal is not at all clear or is narrowly tailored to stopping 
misinformation spread. The framework we propose begins with clearly 
articulating the ultimate goals (and the values that justify them) of the 
moderation regime. This benefit is not particular to the framework we have 
proposed here; it is a general benefit to any clearly articulated, 
longitudinal, and systematic approach. Of course, adopting a clear 
strategic framework does not ensure consistency in application, but it is 
difficult to imagine consistency without one (i.e., it is necessary, not 
sufficient). 
 
● Understanding harms. There is widespread agreement that current 
moderation practices are inadequate. But in order to develop solutions, it 




inadequate. As discussed above, individualistic harm-based analyses are 
insufficient. The types of harms that misinformation contributes to are 
collective and social as well. Moreover, the ways in which those harms are 
realized is often through eroding the social epistemic position of users with 
respect to evaluating sources of information, what information and sources 
to trust, and the diversity of informational sources and perspectives to 
which they are exposed, for example. And because platform users living in 
different cultural contexts will often have very different social epistemic 
contexts as well, harms are also likely to differ across national or cultural 
boundaries. A social epistemic analysis of and approach to content 
moderation therefore helps to more fully characterize the content 
moderation problem and the associated harms and wrongs involved.  
 
● Defining success: As discussed above, it is crucial to have a clear account of 
what counts as success in a labeling strategy (or any content moderation 
strategy). A social epistemology approach favors thinking about success in 
terms of epistemic impacts systematically, rather than in terms of 
exposures or access. The question is not how many people see something, 
but how they are seeing it, and the ways in which it leads changes to their 
epistemic position with respect to things such as information exposure, 
whom they trust, what they take as authoritative, and the diversity of 
informational sources and perspectives.  
 
● Measuring success: Measures of success should reflect the definition of 
success. Are users better constructing their epistemic space as defined by 
the success criteria? Are their information behaviors (sharing, endorsing, 
posting) improving in response to the labels as defined by the success 
criteria? A feature of social networks is that users are co-curators of their, 
and their networks’, information exposure. It should therefore be possible 
to measure changes in their epistemic situation in response to persistent 
labeling by looking at such things as changes in the frequency with which 
they share labeled information, the frequency with which they engage in 
endorsing behaviors for labeled information, whether they begin dropping 
or reducing connections to users who are persistently negatively labeled, 
and whether they look for or explore alternative or more diverse 
informational sources. What works (like what ultimate values and 
normative considerations are most salient) may differ by cultural context. 
 
● Needed platform data and experimental research. The experiences of the major 
platforms in 2020 relating to COVID-19 and the U.S. election have 
produced extraordinary data about content labeling that, so far, is only 
accessible to the platform companies. Measuring success, and thereby 
assessing efficacy of information quality labeling and other moderation 
strategies according to a social epistemology or any other strategic 
approach, is only possible if researchers have access to the data. How those 
millions of content labels affected user behavior, both immediately and 
over longer periods, is a rich potential area of inquiry, including from a 
social psychology perspective. Those data might point to informational 
interventions that modify behavior in positive ways, suggesting boosts 
that provide epistemic positioning for users. Platform data about the use 
of fact-checking more generally and its consequences remain inaccessible, 




researchers and fact-checkers improve outcomes.98 For example, it would 
be very useful to conduct experiments on platforms that vary in 
approaches, such as using more graphical information and providing more 
detail about sources. Importantly, this could help researchers better 
understand how to tailor labels to help put lower-literacy and/or lower-
knowledge users in a better epistemic position, or how to tailor them for 
different informational and cultural contexts. (This research would be 
analogical to research on content label designs and efficacy for nutritional 
and other food labeling.) It is also crucial to determine, in the context of a 
labeling practice, how users respond to unlabeled information and 
sources–e.g., Do they presume reliability in the absence of a negative 
label?—as what matters most from a social epistemology perspective is not 
how users interact with labeled content, but how labeling practices impact 
users’ overall epistemic position. At the end of the day, any public policy 
changes, such as modifications to Section 230, should take into account 
what responsible content moderation looks like when it does more than 
just limit the spread of misinformation, but rather improves the epistemic 
environment for a democratic citizenry very much in need of better 
orientation.  
 
● Innovating new strategies. Taking a social epistemological approach can help 
foster innovative thinking on possible interventions. Instead of asking how 
to slow the spread of misinformation or improve individual critical 
thinking skills, it invites exploring strategies that could improve epistemic 
positions and relationships of users. For example, a social epistemology 
perspective has led to suggestions around labeling sources and sharers of 
information (rather than just pieces of information), 99  as well as norm 
engineering around retweeting.100 It might also inform thinking about how 
to design user co-curation options to enable or nudge them toward better 
(as understood through the epistemic aims) information curation and 
sharing—for example, by inviting them (and making it easy for them) to 
unfollow or block sources or sharers of persistently labeled 
misinformation.  
 
● Situating ethical considerations. There is widespread recognition that ethical 
considerations are relevant to content moderation. However, it is often 
unclear what, precisely, the ethical considerations are and how they ought 
to figure into decisions regarding content moderation. The framework 
offered here begins to explicate both of these. On the framework, ethical 
considerations are relevant to establishing overarching content moderation 
goals, as well as to evaluating candidate content moderation strategies. The 
informational justice approach helps to identify a fuller range of ethical 
considerations that are relevant by encouraging evaluation of policies and 
practices from multiple perspectives, including sources, seekers, and 
subjects of information.  
 
98 The lack of data access from companies remains a major obstacle to independent 
empirical research of many kinds. For a major statement on this issue from many leading 
researchers in the field, see: I. Pasquetto et al., Tackling misinformation: What researchers 
could do with social media data, 1 Harv. Kennedy Sch. Misinformation Rev. (2020). 
99 Rini, supra note 59. 





Again, our goal here has been to elucidate an approach for analyzing and 
responding to the content moderation problem. We have argued that an ethically 
informed social epistemology approach can provide a helpful perspective on 
informational labeling and content moderation more generally. In some senses, 
this has been an exercise in ideal theorizing about content moderation. We have 
not addressed the many incentive-based and structural barriers to the companies 
actually taking this approach, nor have we discussed the many difficult elements 
that would be involved in implementing it. This includes things such as how to 
successfully incorporate third party fact-checking and authoritative information 
sources, defining the appropriate role of AI or algorithmic content moderation 
tools (and implementing them responsibly and effectively), substantively 
specifying normative considerations, and scaling up the labor needed (with fair 
compensation and decent working conditions). Nevertheless, a systematic and 
normatively grounded approach can improve and elevate content moderation 
efforts by providing clearer ideas of what the goals are, how success should be 
defined and measured, and where ethical considerations should be taken into 
account.  
 
